Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Many markets with intermediaries, such as online software markets, match buyers to sellers. It is often costly for buyers to locate the ones they most want, and this can affect the pricing policies of the sellers. Accordingly, intermediaries can increase sales by optimally choosing how to display their relevant products: e.g., to put one product on the front page and put another on the second page on the menu; or display one product close to the door and display another far from the door in the store.

We model the interactions between two sellers, a unit continuum of buyers, and a platform intermediary, in which any extensive search for desired products is costly.[1](#Fn1){ref-type="fn"} The sellers produce vertically differentiated products. The platform, which earns a fixed proportion of the profits from the sellers, selects which products to display on the front page; and the remaining products, if any, are displayed on the second page. We argue that the platform *strategically* decides to delegate products, possibly the better ones, to the second page to soften price competition, thereby extracting more buyer surplus.

In our main model with heterogeneous search costs across buyers, buyers can observe both the prices and qualities of both products, but cannot buy the second-page product before visiting the second page. We find that the shape of the distribution of search costs is a key determinant for the platform's optimal arrangement of the products. For a large class of distributions of search costs, the platform hides the *better* product, which goes against the common findings in the literature.

We further extend our model to incorporate market segmentation: one form of horizontal differentiation. We find that the individual taste difference across products undermines the incentive to obfuscate the access to some products. Thus, when tastes are sufficiently heterogeneous, our previous prediction can be reversed: The platform shifts the focus from reducing price competition to targeting a greater audience.

Online Platforms {#Sec2}
----------------

As an illustration to our model, consider the market for apps for smartphones. According to Gartner ([@CR16]), the market for online mobile applications reached 64 billion downloads in 2012, generating over \$18 billion in revenue. Table [1](#Tab1){ref-type="table"} indicates that the platforms---App Store, Google Play, BlackBerry World, and Windows Phone Store---receive an approximately fixed fraction of seller revenues.[2](#Fn2){ref-type="fn"} Thus, it would be reasonable to think that they are interested in maximizing the sum of the sellers' revenues.Table 1PlatformsNameAvailable appsSeller's share (%)FeeApp Store900,000 (July 2013)56--71\$99/yearGoogle Play1,000,000 (July 2013)70\$25BlackBerry World120,000 (May 2013)70FreeWindows Phone Store160,000 (May 2013)70\$99/year

In the App Store, buyers usually make their purchase decisions from the products that are available on the front page of the platform. Hafner ([@CR19]) describes a typical consumer's behavior: "A survey of iPhones, iPod Touch and Android users\... found that people discover apps most often by browsing app stores. And even though the iTunes store is bloated with offerings, people tend to gravitate to the most popular."

Platforms seem to have the technology (e.g., dynamic content loading) to display more products on the front page so that buyers can find products of interest to them without incurring additional search costs. The question is whether a platform *wants* to display more products on the front page and---if it chooses not to show more products on the front page---which products, of high or low quality, it wants to delegate to other pages.

Related Literature {#Sec3}
------------------

Broadly speaking, our study contributes to the vast literature on oligopoly theory that deals with ways to soften competition.[3](#Fn3){ref-type="fn"} Hotelling ([@CR21]) was the first to model this issue formally. d'Aspremont et al. ([@CR9]) use quadratic transportation costs in the Hotelling model, establishing that the firms choose maximum differentiation to soften price competition. Shaked and Sutton ([@CR30]) show that firms choose to differentiate their products vertically to soften price competition. Lancaster ([@CR25]) proposes the characteristics approach, which was later developed by Anderson et al. ([@CR1]).

The general lesson from these studies is that the relative importance of softening price competition and increasing market demand is the key determinant of product positioning: the degree of product differentiation (Belleflamme and Peitz [@CR7]). Tirole ([@CR34]) identifies three forces that limit product differentiation: (i) the limited scope of price competition due to technology or regulation; (ii) the tendency to place products where the demand is; and (iii) the positive externalities between firms. Each of them increases the relative importance of increasing market demand over softening price competition.

In Sect. [3.1](#Sec7){ref-type="sec"} we show that the platform may choose to display products separately using two pages to soften price competition. However, in Sect. [3.2](#Sec8){ref-type="sec"}, where we introduce a form of individual taste differences across products, we show that the platform would choose to display products together on a single page precisely because of (ii).

Important strands of the behavioral industrial organization literature study how the presence of behavioral consumers---who search too little, stick too much to past choices, and/or have biased expectations about their own future choices---can lead to positive markups even in a competitive environment (see reviews by Grubb [@CR17], [@CR18]). Although we too find that positive markups are offered in equilibrium with competition between sellers, we assume that all agents are *homo economicus*.

Our study more directly contributes to the intentional obfuscation literature. Ellison and Wolitzky ([@CR15]) develop the idea of Stahl ([@CR33]) to consider a form of obfuscation: Sellers may *choose* to increase the search costs to deter buyers from searching, so that the sellers can charge prices that are close to monopolistic ones (see also Wilson [@CR37]).

Another interpretation of obfuscation comes from Ellison ([@CR13]): He studies an add-on price model, where sellers produce vertically-differentiated products, while advertising only low-price products to attract buyers, who will be induced to purchase the upgraded version, the high-quality product. This view is empirically supported by Ellison and Ellison ([@CR14]).

Hagiu and Jullien ([@CR20]) suggest that the platform might strategically increase the effective search costs by intentionally reducing the efficiency of searching. However, in their model the platform intentionally mismatches consumers with their less preferred goods, whereas our platform behaves identically regardless of the type of buyer (see also White [@CR36]).

Empirical studies about search obfuscation acknowledge the significance of search costs, even when these costs involve merely moving one's eyes one line down a list.[4](#Fn4){ref-type="fn"} Koulayev ([@CR24]) finds empirical evidence for the dependence of price elasticity on the size of search costs in online hotel bookings. McDonald and Wren ([@CR27]) find empirical evidence that the practice by online insurance sellers of posting multiple prices under different brand names is consistent with search obfuscation. In contrast, we theoretically show that the platform, not the sellers, obfuscates a product to soften price competition.

In the directed search literature, Weitzman ([@CR35]) asks how an agent would choose the order of sampling for a set of products \[see also Wolinsky ([@CR38]) and Zhou ([@CR39]) for differentiated products\]. Arbatskaya ([@CR2]) studies the pricing rules of homogeneous companies when a sampling sequence is given exogenously. Our paper differs in two ways: first, our products are heterogeneous; and second, the ordering is chosen by the platform, not the buyers.

In a more closely related paper, Armstrong et al. ([@CR3]) analyze prominence in the sense that a prominent firm is one sampled first by consumers. They find the highest-quality firm earns the greatest profit by becoming prominent, implying that consumers sample products in order of quality. In contrast, we find that a platform may display the worse product first.

Another closely related paper is by Song ([@CR32]), who considers the manipulation of product positions on different pages in a similar framework. Unlike our paper, his focuses on horizontal differentiation and shows that goods with more ambiguous characteristics---goods that provide more uncertain utility---are better kept on the front page.

In Baye and Morgan ([@CR6]), advertisers pay fees to the platform to advertise their prices and consumers pay for access to these prices. The platform sets advertising fees sufficiently high to avoid excessive participation and thus excessive price competition between advertisers, which would reduce the rents that the platform can extract from advertisers. In Kamenica ([@CR23]), the platform chooses the sequence of products to show to consumers in order to affect consumers' beliefs about the availability of products. However, we assume that consumers are knowledgeable about their available options.

Athey and Ellison ([@CR4]) study position auctions in which advertisers bid for sponsored-link positions---with values to advertisers that are contingent on the sales to consumers---and consumers rationally infer the qualities of links from the ordering of those links. Athey and Ellison focus on equilibria in which bids are increasing in quality: Sponsored-links are ordered from highest quality to lowest. However, we show that a platform may display the worse product first.

Our paper is also related to the Mussa and Rosen ([@CR28]) model of quality choice by a monopolist. Donnenfeld and White ([@CR12]) establish that increasing the quality difference by reducing the quality of the lower-quality product will increase the monopolist's profit, since it will make it more difficult for buyers with high willingness-to-pay for quality to switch to the lower-quality product, inducing price discrimination.

Similarly, the "damaged goods" literature (Deneckere and McAfee [@CR10]) establishes that with heterogeneity in consumers' private valuations of products, selling the low-quality version in addition to the high-quality version enables the seller better to segment consumers and induce price discrimination. In our model, by contrast, having the low-quality product present can benefit the platform when two pages are used, but this is because it reduces price competition.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. [2](#Sec4){ref-type="sec"} presents a model of product placement with homogeneous search costs. Section [3](#Sec6){ref-type="sec"} deals with heterogeneous search costs across buyers. Section [3.2](#Sec8){ref-type="sec"} incorporates market segmentation. Section [4](#Sec9){ref-type="sec"} concludes. Appendix contains proofs that are omitted from the text.

The Menu Choice Problem {#Sec4}
=======================

In this section, we use a simple one-period model to examine how choices by a platform interact with the prices that are set by two sellers, who face a continuum of buyers of measure one. All agents are risk neutral.

We assume that the platform profit is a *fixed* share of the sum of the sellers' profits.[5](#Fn5){ref-type="fn"} Thus, we can normalize the platform profit as the sum of the sellers' profits. Consequently, in what follows, we envisage the platform's arranging the products to maximize the total profits of the sellers.

The assumption that the platform profit is a fixed share of the sellers' profits reflects the practices of online platforms summarized in Table [1](#Tab1){ref-type="table"}. Moreover, as discussed in Footnote 2, not only online software markets but also other online markets such as Amazon and eBay fit well with this assumption as long as its analysis is within the same category (e.g., within the book department on Amazon). This assumption makes it harder to extend our model to department stores and shopping malls:[6](#Fn6){ref-type="fn"} The operators of such stores may charge different percentages of sales to different store tenants.[7](#Fn7){ref-type="fn"}
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                \begin{document}$$\varDelta >0$$\end{document}$. We assume that qualities are exogenously given, excluding the possibility that sellers adjust their qualities after product positions are arranged. This reflects the fact that qualities are often more difficult to adjust than are prices in response to an arrangement of products.
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                \begin{document}$$r_{2}$$\end{document}$. Buyers can purchase only the products on the pages that they have visited.[9](#Fn9){ref-type="fn"} We impose the following tie-breaking rule: When buyers are indifferent, they purchase a product on the page where they end up; and if there are two products on the same page, they purchase the product of better quality: product 1.
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Homogeneous Search Costs {#Sec5}
------------------------

In this subsection, we assume that all buyers have the same search cost $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$c>0$$\end{document}$. In order to understand the motivation of Assumption 1 below, let us first assume that buyers do not know the price of the second-page product unless they have visited the second page.
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                \begin{document}$$\theta _{1}=1$$\end{document}$ in which both sellers charge the monopoly price. Thus, the *Diamond paradox* (Diamond [@CR11]) arises if buyers do not know the price on the second page.

To see this, suppose $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
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### **Proposition 1** {#FPar1}

*When* $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\theta _{1}=1$$\end{document}$, *the only robust equilibrium is that* $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_{1} = r_{1}$$\end{document}$, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
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                \begin{document}$$r_{1}$$\end{document}$ *to the platform*.

Proposition 1 demonstrates that the Diamond paradox arises: because the buyers expect both sellers to set monopoly prices---if anyone should visit the second page, the second-page seller cannot credibly commit to rewarding the switchers, and would instead succumb to the temptation to maintain the monopoly price so that *after* searching the buyers become indifferent between buying product 2 and not---they have no incentive to do a costly search.

Thus, even if we deal with heterogeneous search costs---because the robust equilibrium does not depend on *c*---the equilibrium outcome is that all buyers decide not to go to the second page. To avoid this version of the Diamond paradox, we impose the following assumption:

### **Assumption 1** {#FPar2}

Buyers know the price and the quality of the product on the second page.

Buyers know both the prices and qualities of both products, but cannot buy the second-page product before visiting the second page. In this sense, the costly search in this model is not to *learn* about products, but rather to *locate* products.

Our analysis extends to a case in which buyers do not know the price on the second page so long as: (1) the second-page seller publicly promises its price in advance; (2) an infinitesimal fraction of buyers visit the second page at the beginning of the trading day; and (3) should the seller in question break its promise, these buyers publicly disclose it, which hurts the seller substantially enough to make it refrain from doing so.[12](#Fn12){ref-type="fn"} Assumption 1 yields Proposition 2:

### **Proposition 2** {#FPar3}
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This illustrates that the platform can soften price competition and enjoy a greater profit than that under Bertrand competition, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Heterogeneities {#Sec6}
===============

In this section, we analyze the effects of introducing heterogeneous search costs on the optimal placement decision by the platform and its associated welfare outcomes. Search costs are distributed i.i.d. according to a distribution $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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**Assumption 2** {#FPar4}
----------------
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Further, in order to simplify our future analysis---because the quitting option affects the equilibrium behaviors in a not very interesting way, as in Proposition 2---we assume that the restrictions imposed by the quitting option do not bind in equilibrium. Since the prices turn out to be independent of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Heterogeneous Search Costs {#Sec7}
--------------------------

With heterogeneous search costs, showing both products on the front page is still the first-best and the subsequent optimal behavior is the same as before: It is socially inefficient for a positive mass of buyers to pay search costs and purchase a product on the second page. However, the platform can now soften price competition by concealing one product. Would the platform prefer to conceal one product, possibly the better one, on the second page?
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*Prices* Prices reflect product qualities. The price of product 1 is increasing in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\varDelta $$\end{document}$, and the price of product 2 is decreasing in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\varDelta $$\end{document}$, regardless of their placements: because $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$c_{1}^{*}(\varDelta )$$\end{document}$ is decreasing, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$c_{2}^{*}(\varDelta )$$\end{document}$ is increasing, and the hazard rates that set the prices are monotone.

Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_{1}$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_{2}$$\end{document}$ be the prices of product 1 and 2 under $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\theta _{1}=1$$\end{document}$, and let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_{1}^{\prime }$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_{2}^{\prime }$$\end{document}$ be the prices of product 1 and 2 under $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\theta _{2}=1$$\end{document}$. By Assumption 2 and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$c_{1}^{*}<c_{2}^{*}$$\end{document}$, it follows that the better product is priced higher if located on the same page: $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_{1}=(1-G(c_{1}^{*}))/ g(c_{1}^{*})$$\end{document}$ is *higher* than $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_{2}^{\prime }=(1-G(c_{2}^{*}))/g(c_{2}^{*})$$\end{document}$; and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_{1}^{\prime }=G(c_{2}^{*})/g(c_{2}^{*})$$\end{document}$ is *higher* than $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_{2}=G(c_{1}^{*})/g(c_{1}^{*})$$\end{document}$.
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### **Proposition 3** {#FPar6}
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### *Example 1* {#FPar7}
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The symmetry, however, is not necessary for the optimality of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### *Example 2* {#FPar8}

Suppose the distribution of *c* is *beta*(1.05, 10), which is positively skewed:$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Let us elaborate why the platform may want to delegate the better product to the second page and that the result is not restricted to the particular density function that is considered in Example 2---the key characteristic required for the result is positive skewness.

### **Claim 2** {#FPar9}

*For the platform to prefer to show only product* 2 *on the front page, one would need a positively skewed distribution of search costs*.
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When product 1 is on the front page, searchers buy product 2, and switchers and stayers buy product 1; when product 2 is on the front page, searchers and switchers buy product 1, and stayers buy product 2. This means that putting product 2, instead of product 1, on the front page affects the platform's profits in three ways:The profits from searchers increase by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\varDelta $$\end{document}$ is small, the cost of obfuscation---that not everyone buys the expensive better product---becomes smaller; therefore, because of the benefit of softening price competition, using two pages is optimal. Thus, the relevant choice for the platform is reduced to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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If the distribution of search costs is positively skewed, regardless of which product is displayed on the second page, many buyers go to the second page. That is, the cost of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\theta _{1}=1$$\end{document}$---that fewer buyers purchase the expensive better product---is high. Thus, it can be optimal to delegate the better product to the second page and induce many buyers to purchase the expensive better product.

Market Segmentation {#Sec8}
-------------------

This subsection illustrates that the interaction of *horizontal* heterogeneity and vertical heterogeneity can *reverse* the results that were obtained under vertical heterogeneity only. To allow for some degree of horizontal differentiation, in the spirit of Wolinsky ([@CR38]) we assume that the population is separated into groups so that some buyers cannot consume or they derive zero utility from one of the products.[17](#Fn17){ref-type="fn"} The buyers are separated into three groups, indexed by *i*, with mass of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Thus, when the prices of both goods are the same, group 3 buyers find product 1 more attractive, but group 2 buyers purchase product 2.
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Returning to Example 2, we can see that the size of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\frac{\mu _{1}-\mu _{2}}{\mu _{3}}$$\end{document}$ is key in the reversal. This is the reason why we ventured into a discussion of horizontal differentiation. A monopolist can obfuscate a product and extract more surplus from buyers by using vertical differentiation.
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Conclusion {#Sec9}
==========

We study a platform's choice of which vertically-differentiated products to display on the front page, when it is costly for consumers to make an extensive search and the platform receives a fixed fraction of the revenues earned by the sellers.

We first show that when buyers' search costs are homogeneous, they do not visit the second page, and they will purchase the better of two products. We then extend this analysis to heterogeneous search costs and find that, when quitting is not a relevant option, the platform has significant incentives to hide one product on the second page, but not necessarily the worse one.

The optimality of putting either the higher- or lower-quality product on the front page can explain the difference between the platforms' methods of ranking apps. If the platform ranks by customers' satisfaction, it displays the better product on the front page. If the platform ranks by the number of downloads, however, a worse product can be displayed first. Thus, the latter method could be optimal if the distribution of search costs is positively skewed.

We further extend our analysis to market segmentation. We show that---especially when market heterogeneity is great---the form of horizontal differentiation can reverse the prediction of our model because it shifts the platform's focus from reducing price competition to targeting a greater audience. We can interpret that, in actual online stores, the front pages contain many products precisely because these products are horizontally-differentiated and unlikely to compete with each other.

Moreover, we expect our main model to fit better with markets that face less heterogeneity in taste (e.g., the market for navigation software, and the market for media players). For a consumer who looks for a program in such a market, all the products on the front page that do not belong to the necessary category can be considered as quitting options. Looking for the model's "product on the second page" for such a consumer requires not only clicking on the link, but also formulating the search query, and filtering the results there.

When the platform hosts more than two products, it can benefit from adding more pages. It benefits not only from increasing the effective search costs by using only the first and the last page, but also from segmenting the buyer population into smaller submarkets, thereby extracting more surplus from buyers. Welfare is likely to suffer because of higher search costs and allocation inefficiency, but the platform can only benefit from adding more pages.

Our model may be tested in a price-volatile market such as the Apple App Store. Observing individuals' buying behavior given the options available on the front and second pages would give us information about the distribution of search costs. Moreover, by observing changes in positioning across pages as responses to updates, we can test whether the platform analyzes product qualities when deciding its product placement.

Appendix: Proofs {#Sec10}
================

*Proof* {#FPar10}
-------
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*Proof* {#FPar11}
-------

*(Proposition* 2*)* We first show that given $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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-------
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The model can be generalized to more than two sellers with a loss of clarity in proofs.

Table [1](#Tab1){ref-type="table"} comes from the Wikipedia entry *List of digital distribution platform for mobile devices*, retrieved on 7 Oct [@CR26], and assembled from the multiple sources cited there. Sellers on Amazon.com pay the higher of a per-item minimum fee or a fixed percentage of the sale price. The fixed percentage differs by category from 8 to 15% with some exceptions. eBay has similar pricing policies.

See reviews by Tirole ([@CR34]), Shapiro ([@CR31]), Cabral ([@CR8]), and Belleflamme and Peitz ([@CR7]).

See Rubinstein and Salant ([@CR29]) for the decision theory literature on the violation of the order irrelevance assumption.

The platform could charge the buyers a participation fee. Many platforms choose not to, precisely because there are many more buyers than sellers. Many platforms are free for buyers, and are not tied to any device or operating system (Amazon, iTunes, Steam), which rules out cross-subsidization or any other direct interest of the platform in the buyers' satisfaction. A fixed fee to sellers would not change the predictions of our model, but in principle our model can be augmented for studying the effects on the endogenous entry of both buyers and sellers; and if this happens, the issue of participation fees will start to matter. In any case, Table [1](#Tab1){ref-type="table"} shows that these fees, even if they exist, are negligible for any serious enterprise.

Supermarkets also carry many products from many sellers and face similar product placement problems. However, our model is not immediately applicable to supermarkets because supermarkets, not sellers, set final good prices in this setting. Sellers still can compete with wholesale prices, but the structure of the problem changes significantly: there is no longer a disagreement between the price setter and the position setter.

However, it could be reasonable to assume that the operator charges similar fees to *actually* competing tenants, whose products are often similar. Even with different margins' being paid to the operator by different sellers, without competition among operators, an operator's choice would be simply biased towards the profit earned by whichever seller gives up the larger profit share, and the sellers' behavior would not change. With competition, endogenizing margin choice would be an interesting issue, but that is beyond the scope of this study.

Marginal costs can be positive, and our analysis qualitatively does not change so long as the difference in marginal costs between the two products is not greater than the quality difference: $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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In this sense, "obfuscation" can be perceived as increasing the difficulty of making a purchase. See Ellison ([@CR13]) for examples of this.

With reverse timing, the arrangement of products would be determined by the prices that firms set. In situations where both firms earn positive profits, a small undercut to another firm will yield a change in positioning, which would result in a larger than first-order effect on the firm's profits; this will lead to mixed strategy equilibria, although these do not seem to emerge in practice. Moreover, prices can be adjusted anytime in online stores; whereas product locations are not easy to change in physical stores. Thus, we focus on a situation in which a platform decides on product placement in anticipation that its placement will affect the degree of price competition.

We find multiple equilibria in the current framework, and therefore we use a robustness check of trembling hand perfection. Suppose that there is an equilibrium where no buyers visit the second page. Then the equilibrium is robust if the second-page seller's behavior is optimal even when a small proportion of buyers visit the second page by mistake. This idea follows closely that of Stahl ([@CR33]).

The results would be the same qualitatively even if we design a more sophisticated model, for instance, based on Wolinsky ([@CR38]).

More precisely, to ensure uniqueness, it is sufficient to assume that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We thank the referee for this example.

To replicate our analysis, the code available here can be used: <https://sites.google.com/site/sergeyvpopov/papers/PlotProfits.m>.

At the other end of the spectrum, we can allow for a continuum of preference types for buyers and show that the log-concavity of the distribution of types, along with symmetry, implies that the better product is put on the front page (Hsu et al. [@CR22]).

As before, this analysis is based on the quitting-option irrelevance. As $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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